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INTRODUCTION
The Army National Guard (ARNG), since 1636 and the calling of the first unit formations of the Massachusetts Bay Colony militia, has participated in every conflict that the United States of America has been involved in. The ARNG has also supported countless domestic emergencies that have befallen America -from hurricanes, to tornados, to floods, to fires, to ice and snow storms, to terrorist attacks.
The National Guard (NG) is unique to the US Armed Forces in that it has this This response is critical to the Army because the ARNG is no longer considered a strategic reserve but part of the Army's operational force. In short, this means that the Army is now utilizing and employing the ARNG as part of its fighting force. The ARNG is no longer called to duty strictly as a last resort. Further, this change reflected in updated war plans and force flow models. This distinction is significant and will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper, however, to illustrate the operational importance of the ARNG, one need only look to numbers of soldiers serving on active duty. Over 40,000 ARNG soldiers have served on active duty supporting these Federal and State missions in 2007. 1 Since September 11, 2001 , the ARNG has mobilized 401,840 2 soldiers for duty in the Global War on Terror. There is little doubt that this force of slightly over 350,000 men and women has been taxed -however, there is even less doubt that these ARNG soldiers have answered their nation's call with honor and faced the enemies of America with the same steely-eyed intensity of their active Army counterparts.
In [2005] [2006] , concern arose among policy makers as well as politicians, 2) Mobilizing ground forces on a unit basis rather than as individual replacements.
3) Establishing a planning objective or goal to achieve a ratio of one-year mobilization followed by five years of "dwell time" (time not mobilized) for RC forces, but specifically states that units may need to be remobilized sooner due to current global demands. The planning objective for the AC was set at 1:2 (deployment: home station).
4) Establishing a new program to compensate or incentivize both active and
reserve members who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or who are extended beyond established rotation policy goals.
5) Directing commands to review hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families or deployed service members.
6) Minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.
The SECDEF memorandum was a significant turning point in formalizing this "operationalization" the reserve forces. For the Guard, the impacts of this policy are immense. One of the effects of the implementation of the policy memorandum was that not only that the ARNG (indeed, all reserve components) would have a limited mobilization of 12-months, but also their "mobilization clocks" would be reset to zero. In essence, all of the reserve forces were immediately eligible for mobilization within the next five years.
The memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force, was a turning point for the Army as it continues to operationalize its reserve components. Over a year has gone by and, thus, the time has come to stop and reflect upon this significant shift in policy. There is little doubt that the policy solved some very significant problems. Solutions are usually good -but in solving a problem, others are typically created. Such is the case with the 12-month mobilization policy. For example, this policy has a significant and adverse impact upon normal force flow rotations for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) because the approximately 9-month ARNG unit rotations BOG do not synchronize with Active 
Time -The Enemy of Mobilization
In order to meet the 12-month mobilization requirements, significant amounts of training, equipment, and resources must be moved to the left of the mobilization date.
This situation is one that is currently being addressed, in earnest, by the Army Staff, the National Guard Bureau 13 (NGB), the First U.S. Army, 14 and RC unit commanders across the United States. Certain decisions must be made early, up to two years in advance of a deployment; these include: mission, location, timelines, units they are backfilling, equipment requirements, training requirements, and manning requirements. Making such decisions will allow commanders to know their mission, their location, their requirements, and other basic, yet critical information. Armed with this information and with enough time to develop plans, any AC or RC unit can successfully accomplish whatever mission is given to them.
These decisions are difficult to make 24 months out, however, because of the fluidity of the Global War on Terror and the bureaucratic systems that have historically manned, equipped, and trained the ARNG as part of the strategic reserve. These systems have caused the time requirement to ready an ARNG unit to be much longer than that of an AC unit, sometimes as much as 180 days of training after mobilization.
This potential lengthy training time, combined with the overall lack of equipment that the ARNG faces, 15 makes gaining time before mobilization to conduct the traditionally postmob training tasks extremely challenging. Equipping these units must be done well in advance. However, in many instances, new equipment is directed from the assembly line to a unit slated for deployment, yet before the equipment arrives the ARNG must send it somewhere else to a higher priority, often and AC unit, that just "cropped up."
When this happens, it is sometimes the case that neither unit gets adequate time and opportunity to train individually on their equipment -let alone to conduct collective training.
Getting each of the man, train, and equip functions into pre-mob timelines does not occur instantly. It takes time -a commodity that is very scarce for an operational warfighting organization. Thus, there is still a significant amount of training being conducted post-mobilization. Guard planners are estimating that it will take ARNG BCTs two to three months to be validated on warfighting tasks before deployment. This leaves the ARNG only nine months BOG time for the Theater Commander to utilize these formations. In some cases there will be more, and in others less. The key is to move what was traditionally post-mob training to pre-mobilization -by doing this, it can be estimated that the nine or even as much as ten month BOG timeline will remain fairly consistent. For every AC BCT mobilized, 1.5 ARNG BCTs must be mobilized to cover the same 15-month timeline. This number will shrink to a 1:1.25 ratio if the Army moves to 12-month deployment, but both reflect the need for more ARNG units than their AC counterparts due to the differing BOG timelines.
Boots on the Ground Imbalance
Additionally, planners need to clearly distinguish between AC and RC units and implement different models for strategic lift, training, equipment needs, and force flow projections. This can be confusing and errors may occur by not making such adjustments. This should not be as much of a challenge for large formations such as
BCTs, but when one implements this across 10-15 BCTs, plus many more combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units, the possibility of such confusion and human error becomes a problem that should not be ignored.
The Cycle of Indecision
The confusion that either can begin with or be exacerbated by the incompatible The concern is that by not making key decisions on which unit will take which mission (or by the decision being changed at any point after the unit is alerted) until the last minute, this the unit selected must have an extended post-mob training period, shorter BOG time, which results in a higher demand for forces.
This cycle of indecision is the heart of the problem that faces mobilizing ARNG formations. Indecision freezes action and prior planning. The problems that flow are in manning, training, and equipping in time to get Guard units in theater. The "unknowns" in this scenario must become "knowns," or as a minimum, be mitigated by addressing the problems that spin from the BOG imbalance. The GFM process also manages rotational forces. In these instances, units, Through proper use of ARFORGEN, the Army will be able to generate forces by knowing when and where to target limited manning, training, and equipping resources.
Global Force Management (GFM) and the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN)
To know the resources that must be directed to what units, either AC or RC, move through three stages of readiness: the Reset/Train, the Ready, and the Available pools are created. Units move through the pools over time and remain in the "Ready" pool for up to one year or until deployed. After the year has expired or the unit has returned from deployment, they will move into the Reset/Train pool and begin again. The speed with which a unit moves through ARFORGEN is different for AC and RC units. The goal for AC units is one deployment in every three years and for RC units the goal is one deployment in every five years. 22 These goals, however, are not currently being met. AC forces are at approximately a 1.25:1 (deployment:dwell) ratio and RC forces are at an approximate 3:1 ratio. 23 With respect to ARNG units, the force generation process is similar to the Army's. The ARNG, like the Army, is seeking to fully implement ARFORGEN and is making progress for BCT and support brigades. Although the ARNG works within the Army system, they must also work with the States and Territories to determine which units will be assigned which mission.
The process, as currently being done (not as it will be when ARFORGEN is fully implemented) begins with FORSCOM, at their annual sourcing conference, identifies a mission that they would like to source with an ARNG unit. The National Guard Bureau then coordinates the mission with the Joint Force Headquarters of states/territories with units available and ready to perform the mission. Once a State/Territory ARNG agrees to take on the mission and the Adjutant General of that State/Territory approves it, the unit information is sent from NGB to FORSCOM to fulfill the request.
When the process goes smoothly, it is effective. However, it all happens much too late for ARNG units to be able to be fully prepared, trained, and ready. For instance, units that are to be deployed in FY09 were not sourced and alerted until after the FORSCOM sourcing conference in early FY08. This means that ARNG unit commanders were not notified two or more years in advance of a mission. The sourcing conference methodology makes this a "batch process" and a "continuous process"
would be much more effective in getting the decisions made sooner. The sourcing conference works well for the AC, however, because they are deploying units at a much faster rate than the ARNG. Notification a year out for an AC unit is, essentially, as early as they need since earlier notification would take place while the unit was in theater on a current rotation and not focused on the next. This imbalance, too, exacerbates the cycle of indecision.
Because units are not identified early, which is attributed to the fluid nature of the battlefield -the rationale that FORSCOM provides for not sourcing units until their annual sourcing conference -the ARNG continues to suffer significant lags in postmobilization training time as well as decreased readiness overall.
Earlier notification and alert of units ensures that commanders, and all of the supporting mechanisms associated with getting that unit ready, can begin with enough time to properly man, train, and equip their units. When ARFORGEN goals are met, it will help -but this is years away due to the high demand for forces. The problems cannot wait for long-term solutions as they are happening now. 24 
A Solution is Needed
The situation has many facets, but must be resolved. There is a long-term solution being worked toward, and it is a good one. The Army's solution to this problem is long-term: reducing the requirements for committed forces, increasing the overall size of the Army (both Active and Reserve), fully implementing ARFORGEN, increasing funding the Army and its components, and the commitment to and programming of funds necessary to convert the ARNG and USAR from a strategic reserve to an operational force. 25 When each of these elements of the Army's plan takes place, much should be resolved.
The Army's solution, however, is not immediate. It will take several years to fully implement -if it is implemented at all. Thus, a short-term "bridging solution" to help manage the most critical issues that the ARNG, and indeed, the Army, is facing must be developed and implemented.
DESCRIBING THE PROBLEMS AS CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
There are a myriad of concerns, all of which are interdependent and overlapping.
The SecDef Memorandum and the imbalance in BOG both feed the cycle of indecision.
Thus, it can be stated that in order to solve or significantly mitigate each of the problems, the key is to stop the cycle of indecision. Injecting stability and predictability into an unstable and unpredictable process can help to achieve this objective.
By analyzing the cycle of indecision as impacted by the SecDef memorandum and the imbalance in BOG, six critical problems become evident. By solving or mitigating each of these problems, a solution should be successful. Therefore, the six problems are described in terms of evaluation criteria for the proposed possible solutions. 26 It will become evident that each of the six criteria can be addressed with stability and predictability to mobilization, training, manning, and equipping functions and processes.
These criteria are:
1. Any solution will have to enable DoD to continue to meet today's operational requirements.
2. Any solution will have to stay within the broad guidelines set in the SecDef memorandum.
3. Any solution will have to be acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.
4. Any solution will have to enable early identification and alert of units. By addressing these six criteria in a single solution, the bridging strategy can be incorporated which will allow time for the Army's slow, bureaucratic systems time to catch up and fully operationalize its reserves.
Criterion #1: Any solution will have to enable DoD to continue to meet today's operational requirements.
This criterion is one that places the mission first. The US Army has significant and far-reaching requirements worldwide. The ARNG, as part of the Army, must be remain accessible. Meeting the many operational requirements may seem obvious, but its importance cannot be understated.
Therefore, any course of action that can be seen as limiting the DoD from its ability to meet current and potential missions will not be selected. These include operational requirements both domestic and abroad, both natural and man-made.
Criterion #2: Any solution will have to stay within the broad guidelines set in the SecDef memorandum.
The SecDef memorandum established significant boundaries that the services have with regard to mobilizing reserve forces. This criterion states that the solution must be compliant with the memorandum by staying inside of these boundaries. Two such boundaries must not be crossed:
1. Limiting total mobilization to a maximum of 12 months.
Emphasize unit mobilizations versus individual mobilizations.
To successfully pass this criterion, each of these sub-criteria must also be passed. Any course of action that seeks to increase the mobilization timeline beyond the 12 months established by the SecDef memorandum will not be accepted. Any COA that recommends moving to a policy of more individual replacement will not be selected.
Criterion #3. Any solution will have to be acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.
As discussed already, no leader in either DoD or the Army will accept a solution that goes beyond partial mobilization because to do so would be politically infeasible.
There are other issues that would make a possible solution either more or less attractive to a given DoD or Army leader, depending upon that individual's perspective and constituency. The most successful solution, therefore, will be one that the entire DoD and Army leadership can support.
Criterion #4: Any solution will have to enable early identification and alert of units.
This criterion is very important. A good solution to this problem will ensure that units are identified and alerted at least two years in advance of mobilization. Two years is a goal that is discussed by the Army leaders. 27 The alert is a key trigger to begin funding to be dedicated to the deploying unit. DA G3 staffers recognize these units and their readiness is tracked and reported to the VCSA weekly. In other words, these units gain visibility in the process and they are treated as is any other Army deployer, regardless of component.
Criterion #5: Any solution will have to enable ARNG to know what resources are needed for the mission and know what of these resources are not already in theater.
Any solution must also address two associated concerns; both primarily associated with equipment resources, but also can be easily correlated to training and personnel resources. These two concerns are 1) the necessity to increase accuracy in forecasting needed resources and 2) improving visibility and management of theater provided equipment (TPE).
1) Increased accuracy in forecasting necessary resources. Unit commanders
need to know the types of equipment and ammunition, as well as the numbers of soldiers that they will need to accomplish their wartime mission. The sooner that they gain visibility on the mission, the sooner they assess the personnel needed, the equipment required, and the types of training necessary to be fully ready to conduct their assigned mission in combat.
Clearly, in the case of equipment readiness, there is a significant need to get equipment to deploying units as early in the process as possible. The ARNG is seeking to get the majority of the significant equipment needed by a unit 24+ months before mobilization. This is a difficult thing to do, however, because there is a finite amount of equipment available. Equipment comes to a unit from only a few sources: new equipment, rebuilt/refurbished equipment, transferred or cross-leveled equipment from another unit, or equipment that is in theater already which is known as theater provided equipment (TPE).
What this means is that except for some new equipment coming off the lines, the current state of equipment procurement amounts to a "zero-sum game." On the ground, this means that a unit will not get the needed resources because a sooner-deploying unit requires it earlier. This situation, though inconvenient, is not apt to change.
Therefore, the best way to mitigate this issue is derived when the understanding of the requirements are known well in advance.
Therefore, the COA that can most successfully provide early forecasting of the resources needed by a unit will score higher on this sub-criterion.
2) Improved management and visibility of theater provided equipment (TPE).
Related to the forecasting sub-criterion, is one that does a better job of managing and providing overall visibility of TPE. Before discussing the specifics of this sub-criterion, however, a brief background of TPE is needed to explain why management and visibility must be improved. Thus, it can be stated that any COA that allows for a greater visibility and management of TPE will be considered a better option than those COAs that do not. This course of action, on the surface, would solve the problems created by the imbalance in BOG time because there would be no imbalance. All Army forces would be in theater for~9 months. This COA is one, in fact, that the Army is working to achieve, however, the number of forces available and the significant requirement make this COA fail the first criterion, the ability to meet the operational requirements of the DoD. Declaring full mobilization would, in effect, allow the President to have unlimited access to all reserve components. By implementing such a mobilization, there would be no further timelines and ARNG units could conduct as much post-mobilization training as necessary until they were properly manned, trained, and equipped for deployment.
This course of action, though effective, fails both Criteria #2 and #3. This COA violates the one-year mobilization tenant of the SecDef memo and it discounts the resetting of the mobilization clock tenant of the SecDef memo. Key leaders in the DoD or the Army would not accept it because, as stated earlier in the paper, the idea of a full-mobilization is not politically feasible.
COA 4: Give ARNG Specific Unit Mission Sets (SECFOR, etc)
Of the failed courses of action, COA 4 was very close to surviving. Therefore, additional attention will be given to it to fully explain why it was rejected in the end. This course of action solves many of the problems and passes many of the criteria. It stays within the guidelines of the SecDef memorandum; it allows for the early identification and alert of units; it enables the ARNG to know better forecast and manage resources, and it enables the Army and ARNG to complete post-mobilization training within three months or less.
The two criteria that the COA does not pass, however, relate to meeting the DoD operational requirements and being acceptable to DoD and Army senior leadership.
With regard to not meeting DoD operational requirements the concern is that the ARNG will need to disassemble and reassemble many functional combat and certain combat support units in order to fully embrace this mission. Essentially, the Guard combat BCTs, of which there are 28, will need to be reclassified to multiple SECFOR companies with appropriate headquarters structure. These companies are not organic to the Army's unit structure and must be taken from other types of units. Equipment, personnel, and training must be provided and these SECFOR companies have a large amount of vehicles, weapons, communications, and night-vision systems in their mission essential equipment lists.
When combat brigades are broken apart to form these other companies, a significant amount of the Army's ground forces are lost in terms of training, equipping and actual "ready" forces. Criterion #1 indicates that future conflicts must be considered as well as the current operations and by breaking apart as significant number of ARNG units to form other units, the DoD would be giving up significant future capability from its Operational ARNG. This COA fails the first criterion because of these reasons.
Criterion #3 states that DoD and Army (including ARNG) leadership must be able to support a given COA. It must be stated clearly that the ARNG has never backed away from a mission it was asked to perform and would fully (and probably very successfully) execute a SECFOR-only mission were the organization directed to do so.
If he DoD, Army, NGB and ARNG leadership saw more value than harm in accepting a single mission in order to solve these other problems (and, in turn, make life better for all of the Army's soldiers as a result), they would be fully supportive. However, in the decision making process, this COA would meet with some significant resistance by many DoD, Army, and National Guard leaders.
The primary reason for the resistance would be the same reason the COA failed Criteria #1: doing this would degrade the Army's combat capability. However, another reason exists. The Army and the ARNG have long been at odds over the relevance of Guard forces. In recent years significant and, in fact, unprecedented progress has been made by the Army to not only repair the relationships between itself and its component, but to embrace the ARNG and take active steps to ensure the Guard's success.
Significantly higher amounts of resources have been programmed to the ARNG since 2002, including funds, equipment, training seats, decision-making authority and more.
It is getting to the point that both the Army and the ARNG are close to letting go of the old fears and baggage that plagued their relationship for decades. The concern by DoD, Army, and Guard leaders may be that these excellent gains could be reduced were the ARNG asked to break its combat structure, even temporarily, to invest itself in SECFOR units.
This COA was rejected for these reasons.
Summary
Of these failed COAs, none are necessarily bad; in fact, all have merit at one level or another. The concern is that none of these COAs solves or mitigates all of the problems created by the imbalance in BOG time and the cycle of uncertainty. One COA, however, does resolve or mitigate each problem. This COA is the only one that fully meets each of the criteria. The following discussion will address each individually.
Meeting Operational Requirements.
Selecting this COA enables the Army as a whole to continue to meet today's DoD operational requirement. The COA assumes that the sector selected by the ARNG is of the size and troop requirement that is sustainable by the ARNG over time. When deciding the correct size for the force, the ARNG and Army must consider the myriad of other operational missions the ARNG is engaged in and plan for these as well. This includes a contingent remaining to protect and defend the Homeland; the ARNG's top priority.
Over the course of Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08), the ARNG has and will deploy several BCTs into Iraq. This is in addition to their already robust presence in Bosnia, Kosovo, Guantanamo Bay, the Sinai, and Afghanistan. Planners have determined that the ARNG, using the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) will have five or six BCTs available in any given year and ready for deployment. This would then be the maximum number of BCTs that the ARNG could commit to current operations.
Considering the other requirements that the ARNG has it may be that three BCTs is the "right" number. In addition to the combat formations, planners must include a Division
Headquarters, and the associated CS/CSS units necessary to support the sector.
The requirement for a strategic reserve is neither reduced nor eliminated by the operational reserve necessity. Therefore, an important consideration in determining the size of the ARNG sector is to keep in mind that additional troop surges or to support contingencies as necessary. Though not an easy task considering the large current operational requirement, such surges can be compensated for using this COA.
Meeting SecDef Memorandum Guidelines.
The "Guard Sector" COA does not violate any of the constraints laid out in the SecDef memorandum. First, it allows for a 12-month maximum mobilization and the ARNG would be in full control of this with respect to troops in the ARNG sector. Second, the COA encourages unit mobilizations by employing all types of Guard units, including
Division Headquarters and CS/CSS formations.
Ensuring Senior Leader Acceptability.
This course of action will be acceptable to DoD, Army, NGB, ARNG, and State National Guard leaders. It will not be completely agreed to by all, but when considered fully, it becomes evident that the positives of implementing such a strategy will have positive, long-term benefits to the entire Army, not only to the ARNG.
The key to success in this criterion is to display how this COA will benefit the total Army -as well as benefit the entirety of the OIF/OEF AORs. The primary arguments against giving the ARNG as sector will be issues of trust and issues of integration of forces.
Issues of trust.
Although the ARNG has been decisively engaged in the GWOT since its inception, there will linger a kernel of doubt in the minds of the Army leadership Because of the complex nature of the task, and meaning no disrespect to the ARNG, there will be DoD and Army leaders who will simply not concur of giving operational command to an entire sector of the OIF theater to ARNG personnel. What these well-intentioned individuals must remind themselves of is the reality of the current situation we are facing as an Army. The move toward an operational reserve and the challenges of the GWOT has forced DoD to take many managed risks. Allowing the ARNG to take control of an Iraqi sector would be another in this long list -and solving the larger problem is well worth taking. As stated earlier, bold, dynamic, and risk-taking action is required.
Issues of integration of forces. This problem states that by giving the ARNG an
Iraqi sector, the Army will be dividing itself. The long-time goal for the Army has been better integration of its forces -not division of them. This solution, on the surface, is not very "Total Force." However, when the situation is looked at holistically, particularly in terms of the criteria laid out in this paper, it becomes clear that this separation of the ARNG and the AC is worth violating a desire for further AC/RC integration. In addition, unlike the what has been true in the past so frequently, the reason for the separation is not perceived concerns about different levels of performance, abilities, or capabilitiesit is largely driven by the mandated differences with each of the problems described in this paper and seeking a way to deal with these difficult realities.
Early identification and Alert of Units.
If this course of action is implemented, the ARNG will know specifically what their OIF requirements are at any given time. This knowledge will allow the ARNG to consistently and continuously identify and alert ARNG units 24 months in advance without waiting for the FORSCOM sourcing conference. The ARNG will be able to better match both BCTs and support units to the requirements -this gives unit commanders much more time to train for their specific missions, thereby increasing the effectiveness and overall readiness of the deploying units.
Providing Focus to Limited Resources.
Increased accuracy in forecasting necessary resources. If the ARNG is given a sector, and thereby can establish early identification of units two or more years before the mobilization and deployment -they will know what resources are needed by each of these units to properly conduct their mission. Having this knowledge will allow the Guard to know the requirements in personnel, training, and equipping and will be able to wisely expend limited resources to more effectively spend and direct these funds. This is proven in the ARNGs other missions, such as MFO Sinai and K-FOR. The ARNG is able to identify units well in advance and they know the mission requirements. These balance in a very efficient resourcing operation for the Guard. Such can be said if the recommended COA is implemented.
The obvious counter to this argument is that even if the ARNG were given this sector immediately, it would take them up to two years to finally reach the full, "two-year out" notification. However, this argument will be accurate for any plan that the Army implements and, in truth, is an excellent reason to make the decision quickly and implement the ARNG sector immediately.
Improved management and visibility of theater provided equipment (TPE).
Understanding the equipping nightmare known as TPE is never going to be easy. There is equipment in the Middle East that may never be accounted for. That being said, the USMC and the coalition forces should have a much easier time of tackling this problem than the US Army primarily due to the smaller size of their sectors. Smaller size equates to less equipment, which further equates to better accountability. By knowing what equipment is provided by theater, the units operating within that "known TPE"
battlespace are then able to forecast requirements with a greater degree of accuracy.
This knowledge is particularly important for ARNG and forces that must ship equipment before mobilization in order for it to arrive in theater on time. 
Ensure Post-Mobilization Training is at or Below 90 Days
The final problem is critical. In order to meet the 12-month mobilization guideline outlined in the SecDef memorandum, ARNG units of every type must be able to obtain at least nine months BOG with goals of even longer times. This means that they need to have three or fewer months of post-mob training. The only way to do this is for unit commanders to know their missions well in advance; two years or longer is recommended. With this knowledge, commanders can prepare their training calendars appropriately to be confident that they will not need any additional time over this threemonth timeline. This COA allows, after a short amount of time, commanders this needed information -and, more importantly, the missions should not change as often happens now. The cycle of indecision presses the need for the sourcing of different units at times and the perpetuation of the cycle continues this problem. The ARNG, when managing its own sector, will be responsible to ensure that this does not happen.
They, more than any other organization, have an understanding of and a stake in their own soldiers. When the cycle of indecision is broken, these incidences of mission change should occur only when they are and operational necessity -not a function of mismanagement.
Stopping the Cycle of Indecision
If this solution were implemented, the Cycle of Indecision would be halted. No longer would the ARNG need to wait for the FORSCOM sourcing conference to determine what missions were going to be made available for ARNG units for OIF. The ARNG would be able to implement an ARFORGEN timeline very effectively as the OIF mission would become part of their "known" mission set and would thereby be much less turbulent.
Planners could identify the necessary BCTs and supporting units needed for each of these known missions years in advance. This would allow commanders to fully prepare their units for successfully reaching each manning, equipping, and training readiness goal before mobilization. The stabilization and predictability afforded by selecting this course of action would be invaluable to the ARNG, the Army, and the DoD as a whole.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to develop courses of action (COA) and recommend a solution that will help mitigate the problems associated with not only the SECDEF memorandum, but with the problems associated with incompatible BOG time and the cycle of indecision and this purpose was achieved. Several problems were described and were used as criteria to evaluate five courses of action. Of these COAs, only "creating an ARNG sector in Iraq" solved or mitigated each of the criteria.
Therefore, this COA is recommended.
Often, when bureaucracies are faced with opportunities and needs to make transformational change, they are stalled into inaction. The DoD, the Army, and the The report states in the executive summary "DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DOD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DOD's organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism. DOD was also considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that would have expanded its pool of available personnel. This policy revision would have authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months without limiting the number of times personnel could be mobilized, and thus provide an essentially unlimited flow of forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative approach, but DOD did not elaborate in its comments on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements." 13 The NGB is the DoD Joint Activity over both the ARNG and Air National Guard (ANG) Directorates in Washington DC, as well as to the 54 Joint Force Headquarters in each State, three Territories, and the District of Columbia.
